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MATERIAL EVIDENCE: LEARNING FROM ARCHAEOLOGICAL PRACTICE 
Alison Wylie and Robert Chapman 
 
A PASSION FOR THINGS 
In recent decades, the arcana of archaeology have come sharply into focus as a 
subject and a resource that humanists and social scientists cannot afford to ignore, 
however resolutely text-based or wedded to face-to-face, “reactive” modes of inquiry 
they may be. The “in-depth study of things,” declare the editors of the Object Reader 
(Candlin and Guins 2009: 2), has taken shape in a sprawling diversity of research 
programs ranging from metaphysical interrogation of materiality as such, to probing 
analyses of the ways in which meaning and matter are entangled in specific objects 
and contexts of action. Object biographies have captured popular imagination, in the 
form of the wildly successful History of the World in 100 Objects (MacGregor 2010), 
and now figure as prominently in the history of science and technology as in art 
history and cultural studies (Daston 2008). This attention to objects – this 
appreciation of the dynamic, consequential social lives of things – has catalyzed the 
formation of a distinct interdisciplinary field of material culture studies (Myers 2001: 
5),1 one that now has a history of its own in which the insights that set the field in 
motion are themselves subject to critical scrutiny. To insist that things be seen as a 
medium through which the social is articulated and meaning communicated is now 
decried as a “colonization of the object by the subject and the social” (Candlin and 
Guins 2009: 4), charged with trading in the very Cartesian oppositions between mind 
and matter it was meant to displace (Henare et al. 2007: 1-3).2 The turn to things – 
objects, the body, artifacts, traces – is thus reinforced by renewed insistence that 
objects must be engaged in material as well as symbolic and social terms.  
 
In all these contexts object studies are compelling, not only because the stuff of lives 
lived is intrinsically interesting and is constitutive of these lives, but because it is 
invaluable as evidence. Thinking with (or through, or about) things has opened up 
otherwise inaccessible areas of inquiry and it has reconfigured our understanding of 
a great many longstanding topics of social scientific interest, from the dynamics of 
popular culture to the form and logic of political regimes (Auschlander 1996), from 
the condensation of value and the nature of commodities to the ramifying 
construction of social difference and solidarity (Appadurai 1986; Myers 2001). The 
brief for assembling A History of the World in 100 Objects was to “tell a history of the 
world that [had] not been attempted before,” one that is “truer,” more comprehensive 
and, crucially, “more equitable than one based solely on texts” (MacGregor 2010: xv, 
xxv, xix). Objects and traces have the potential to “give voice” to those who left no 
texts, to contest history as written by elites and victors, to bear witness to dimensions 
of life no one thought to tell, or actively suppressed.  
 
This commitment to explore the kinds of history that “only a thing can tell” 
(MacGregor 2010: xxii) is not new. “History from below” has been championed at 
least since the Marxist Historians Group took shape in the UK after WW2, and it has 
antecedents dating to the 1930s (Beard 1935, Becker 1931). Although E. P. 
Thompson’s Making of the English Working Class (1963) is the most widely cited 
example,3 Hilton is especially interesting because his research on medieval 
peasantry lead him to initiate, with archaeologist Phillip Rahtz, the excavation of a 
deserted medieval village at Upton (Goucestershire); evidence of people’s houses 
and everyday possessions had the potential, he thought, to enlarge the scope of 
inquiry beyond dependence on texts.4 Expanding on the tradition of class-based 
analysis, feminist, critical race, and postcolonial historians, to name a few, have 
demonstrated just how different history looks when centered on the lives of those 
who have largely been written out of account. But to tell these counter-histories – of 
the everyday, of habit and localized practice, of the marginal – requires considerable 
ingenuity, reading canonical texts against the grain, expanding the archive to include 
what had been dismissed as ephemera and, crucially, drawing on the non-textual 
evidence afforded by physical traces and material things. Historical archaeologists 
have been especially forthright in insisting that rigorous scrutiny of material evidence 
is not just a supplement to text-based histories but often the only resource we have 
for exposing and correcting “superficial and elitist…myths[s] for the contemporary 
power structure” (Glassie 1977: 29): the systematic distortions that arise from 
ignoring “the inarticulate” (Ascher 1974: 11), the “endless silent majority who did not 
leave us written projections of their minds” (Glassie 1977: 29). These themes are 
taken up by contributors to a recent discussion of “Historians and the Study of 
Material Culture” in the American Historical Review (Auslander et al. 2009) which 
begins with the observation that, “while some might still associate [the study of 
material culture] with objects found in museums or things from the remote past, it is 
in fact a field that takes an interest in all conceivable objects and every historical 
period”; it is especially relevant to any historical subject that takes as its subject a 
“concern for everyday life and the material circumstances of ordinary people” (AHR 
editor, Auschlander 2009: 1355). 
 
Parallel arguments for attending to material evidence also figure in sociology, 
although for more strictly methodological reasons. In a classic of the 1960s the 
proponents of Unobtrusive Measures (Webb et al. 1966) made the case that, given 
the inescapable limitations of “reactive” methods, it is folly to proceed “simply by 
asking,” whether this takes the form of participant observation or structured 
interviews, surveys or experimental interventions. They detail a range of interactive 
dynamics and interviewer or intervention effects that arise from the ways in which 
subjects manage their self-presentation in response to what they perceive as the 
expectations of a research setting, compromising the internal and external validity of 
standard research methods in the social sciences (Webb et al. 1966: Chapter 1). The 
only way forward is to engage the resources of multiple methods, including 
underdeveloped strategies for using inadvertently produced physical traces as 
evidence of patterns of action, preference, and intention that survey respondents or 
interviewees might not themselves be aware of, or might be disinclined to disclose 
(Webb et al. 1966: 3, 34). In a vigorous renewal of the case for “revalorizing sources 
marginalized by dominant social science,” Lee emphasizes the value of “ephemeral 
traces” of movement and interaction in a social environment – physical erosion or 
accretion, the litter discarded, the “performative opportunities” afforded by objects – 
as “caches of data” that make possible strategies of triangulation (Webb et al. 1966: 
XX). The principle here is that evidence from very different sources, in this case 
archival and material, should be mobilized as an independent basis for assessing the 
results of reactive methods (Lee 2000: 1, 8, 14). The Tucson “Garbage Project,” 
initiated by archaeologist William Rathje in the early 1970s and later expanded 
internationally, embodies a similar rationale; the systematic analysis of what we throw 
away, recovered from curbside garbage collection and through the excavation of 
landfill sites, often reveals patterns of consumption that stand in stark contrast with 
the results of surveys that depend on self-reports (Rathje and Murphy 1992).  
 
In all these areas, then, an enthusiasm for the capacity of material things and 
physical traces to function as evidence reflects an appreciation of their stubborn 
concreteness, the “brute intransigence of matter,” as Daston puts it (2008 [2004]: 11), 
by virtue of which they are sometimes seen as impartial witnesses to the past, 
bearing marks of their makers, their various uses, and the shifting configurations of 
meaning and action in which they have been implicated in the course of their travels. 
However enigmatic they may be, this “bony materiality” sustains a certain epistemic 
optimism, even when the more naïve aspects of a “positivist historiography of facts” 
have been abandoned (Daston 2008: 15-16). But for all this, a recurrent theme in the 
literature valorizing objects as subject and source is that there has been too little 
attention to things themselves. This concern figures prominently in reflection on 
formative examples of object studies dating to the 1990s. Gell rejected sociological 
and iconographic alternatives to the “aesthetic preoccupations” of then-contemporary 
anthropology of art on grounds that they effectively ignore “the art object itself”; they 
“look…only at the power [of the object] to mark distinctions” or treat it as a “species 
of writing” and consider only its symbolic meaning (1992: 43).5 Similarly, Corn took 
aim at “object myths” in the history of technology. Reviewing publications through the 
1990s he found that, despite a rhetoric privileging the object, a substantial majority of 
historians of technical artifacts relied exclusively on textual or oral sources; fewer 
than a third had undertaken object-based analysis and typically only for periods or 
contexts for which textual sources are not available (1996: 37). Although this has 
certainly changed, even historians who are committed to the study of material culture 
lament the fact that “we observe the march of images into the historian’s study, but 
physical objects are mostly kept at arm’s length”; material culture may be a subject of 
study, but material things and traces are not still not “among the standard resources 
of academic research in the humanities and social sciences” (Sibum in Auschlander 
et al. 2009: 1384). This is evident in the Object Reader and Things that Talk; text-
based analysis of the social and symbolic significance of objects continues to 
dominate the study of material culture, both as a subject in its own right and as a 
resource for social and historical inquiry of other sorts. As Simon Werrett argues in 
his contribution to this volume, even though historians of science have largely 
abandoned intellectual history and cultivated an interest in the material culture of 
science, “they have done so with a relatively limited disciplinary repertoire”; they tend 
to proceed by “reading about things rather than engaging with them directly” 
(Chapter 19, PG). 
 
This disconnection between intent and practice should come as no surprise. The 
challenges of working with material evidence are legendary, and the prejudices of the 
literate continue to favor the seeming transparency of textual records and the direct 
testimony of subjects.6 They are also reinforced by traditions of disciplinary 
specialization that set the human, social sciences apart from the biological and 
physical, reproducing a divide not unlike like that lamented by C. P. Snow in the late 
1950s (1963 [1959]). To make effective use of physical traces and objects as 
evidence requires expertise in an enormous range of fields, most of them not ones in 
which humanists and social scientists have any training. Consider, for example, Marc 
Bloch’s reflection on the demands of research in historical ecology: 
  
Now, if almost any important human problem…demands the handling of diverse 
types of evidence….the types of evidence necessarily mark off the several 
branches of technical scholarship. The apprenticeship for each is long, but full 
mastery demands still longer and almost constant practice. For example, very 
few scholars can boast that they are equally well equipped to read critically a 
medieval charter, to explain correctly the etymology of place-names, to date 
unerringly the ruins of dwellings of the prehistoric, Celtic, or Gallo-Roman 
periods, and to analyze the plant life proper to a pasture, a field, or a moor. 
Without all these, however, how could one pretend to describe the history of land 
use? (Bloch 1953: 68).7  
 
Add to this catalogue of necessary expertise the resources of material science and 
physical geology, art historical interpretation and ethnohistory, the sciences of 
cognition and of biomedicine, all fields required to understand the cultural context 
and human implications of land use patterns, and the complexity of the enterprise is 
apparent. The gulf between these various fields is not always characterized by the 
stark incomprehension that concerned Snow, but the range of expertise required to 
ground material culture studies in rigorous analysis of the material – to meet 
MacGregor’s demand that objects be “interrogated and interpreted as deeply and 
rigorously as the written report (2010: xvi) – is daunting in its variety. As the editor 
moderating the American Historical Review discussion observes, there are a great 
many questions that “strike at the heart of methodological concerns we don’t often 
discuss” (Auschlander et al. 2009: 1355); “to take cues from the objects themselves,” 
historians will have to “work hard to develop methods in order to make speak the 
silent representatives of the past” (Sibum in Auschlander et al. 2009: 1359). 
THE WISDOM OF PRACTICE  
It is primarily archaeologists who have taken on these challenges, and yet they figure 
very little in the object studies literature. Since the early nineteenth century they have 
built up a repertoire of research strategies specifically designed to mobilize the 
evidence of human lives and events that survives in an enormous range of material 
evidence, from garbage dumps to monuments, from the physical traces of single 
events to the palimpsest of evidence that bears witness to long-term, large scale 
cultural processes, from finely crafted artifacts rich with cultural significance to the 
inadvertent traces left by human activity on a continent-wide scale and in the 
minutiae of domestic consumption. In the process they have decisively enlarged, 
challenged, and reconfigured what we know about the past, putting material 
evidence to work in the investigation of a great many different aspects of the cultural 
past. The tempo and process of development varies by region, but from the early 
nineteenth to the mid-twentieth centuries archaeologists built relative and absolute 
chronologies and made use of material evidence as a proxy for cultural affinity, 
focusing on artefacts in settlement and burial contexts, and on monumental 
architecture. By the mid-twentieth century in many areas these local histories of 
material culture had been integrated into regional and inter-regional typologies and, 
with growing attention to botanical and faunal remains, they delineated distinct 
ecological and subsistence regimes and major cultural transitions. The ecological 
contexts of people’s everyday lives and subsistence practices became the subject of 
pioneering studies in Scandinavian and British archaeologies from the 1930s and 
were influential in the Americas in the 1950s, providing the basis for refined models 
of regional settlement and subsistence patterns of the kind developed by Wiley in the 
Viru valley, Peru (1953) and by McNeish in the Sierra de Tamaulipas, Mexico (1958). 
The processual archaeologists of the 1960s and 1970s built on such studies by 
analyzing the underlying adaptive dynamics of cultural systems and constructing 
large scale, long-term systemic models of their social, political and economic 
structures (see examples in Binford and Binford 1968). Through the 1980s, in 
reaction against this system-level eco-materialism, postprocessual archaeologists 
developed a program of material culture studies focused on symbolic meaning and 
agency (e.g., Hodder 1982). Archaeologists had long been interested in social 
identities; for example, in the form of enclaves like the Oaxacan barrio identified by 
Millon in the city of Teotihuacan (1973) and, from the early 1990s, gender, race and 
ethnic identity (e.g., Gilchrist 1999; Battle-Batiste 2011; Leach et al. 2009). In 
developments in the last two decades that parallel the object studies literature, there 
has been much focus on the materiality of objects marked by debate about what 
distinguishes materiality from materials (e.g., Ingold 2007; Knappett 2012), and now 
on objects as ‘things’ and their entanglements with the social, the ideational, and 
diverse forms of agency (e.g., Olsen 2010; Hodder 2012).  
 
The question that animates this collection of essays is, then: how do archaeologists 
do this? How do they make effective use of physical traces and objects as 
repositories of evidence? There is a great deal of wisdom embodied in the practices 
by which archaeologists assemble, analyze, integrate and adjudicate physical 
evidence but all too often this wisdom has been obscured by sharply polarized 
internal debate about the limitations of material evidence. There have always been 
epistemic pessimists who insist that, insofar as claims about the past overreach the 
available evidence and the evidence itself is an interpretive construct, the 
conclusions that archaeologists draw can be nothing more than speculation. In an 
especially strong statement of this position in the mid-1950s M. A. Smith insisted that 
there is no “necessary link” between the surviving record and “the human activities 
we should like to know about”; the inference from one to the other is, therefore, “a 
hopeless task” (1955: 3-4). Similar concerns have surfaced repeatedly in Anglo-
American archaeology since the early twentieth century (see Wylie 2002: Part I) but, 
just as regularly, they have been rebutted by epistemic optimists who insist that the 
limitations lie not in the material record itself but in the intellectual and material 
resources archaeologists bring to bear in recovering and interpreting it. The 
advocates of processual archaeology in the 1960s and 1970s were particularly 
adamant that, if archaeologists adopted a properly scientific hypothesis-testing 
methodology they could meet the gold standard of deductive certainty they 
associated with rigorous scientific inquiry (Binford 1962, 1972; Watsonet al. 1971). 
Postprocessual critics were quick to object that archaeological evidence is as much a 
construct, therefore as insecure a ground for testing as for building hypotheses about 
the cultural past and some insisted, on these grounds, that relativist conclusions are 
inescapable: “there is literally nothing independent of theory or propositions to test 
against” (Shanks and Tilley 1987: 111); archaeologists should candidly acknowledge 
that they simply “create facts” (Hodder 1983: 6). The upshot, as Killick describes it, 
was that the “stories archaeologists tell are no more than politically charged fables 
imposed from the present onto the past” (5). Few held such extreme positions for 
long; although intransigent in their rejection of the deductivist ideals of the New 
Archaeology, postprocessual critics nonetheless acknowledged that archaeological 
data have an impressive capacity to “resist theoretical appropriation” (Shanks and 
Tilley 1989: 44), and New Archaeologists made it a priority to build a robust, 
empirically grounded body of “middle range theory” to underpin the interpretation of 
surviving material traces as evidence. Although the “theory wars” have largely died 
down in recent years (Johnson 2010: 220-3), the epistemic anxieties and ambitions 
that gave them impetus continue to structure archaeological thinking. For example, in 
his contribution to this volume, Gavin Lucas traces the contrasting legacies of 
metaphors for the archaeological record that embody, on one hand, a “negative 
epistemology” – the archaeological record as “fragment,” incomplete and 
compromised – and, on the other, a more hopeful emphasis on survival and 
continuity into the present associated with the metaphor of “relic.”  
 
For the most part debate about the epistemic status of archaeological evidence has 
been conducted at a level of abstraction that provides little useful guidance for 
practice. And although there are a great many handbooks on the practicalities of field 
work and techniques of analysis, archaeologists have published comparatively little 
that captures the underlying rationale for specific forms of practice, in the mid-space 
between “how to” guides and philosophical generalities. What is needed, we suggest, 
is resolutely case-based analysis of actual practice – key instances of exemplary 
practice, critical turning points, innovations, and instructive failures in the use of 
archaeological data as evidence – aimed at making explicit the norms of evidential 
reasoning that have taken shape in the context of evolving traditions of practical 
experience working with archaeological material. This is the goal we had in view 
when we took up the project of assembling this collection of essays; we draw 
inspiration from David Clarke’s brief for an internal philosophy of science that 
addresses the challenges faced by archaeologists, rather than imposing models 
developed to make sense of physics (1973), and we see it as an extension of Ian 
Hodder’s call for systematic reflection on the dynamics of “archaeological process” 
(1999).  
 
To this end we asked each contributor to identify a particular aspect of evidential 
reasoning with which they grapple and to consider, with reference to concrete 
examples in their area of specialization, how they construct evidential claims, 
critically assess them, and bring them to bear on pivotal questions about the cultural 
past. We asked, more specifically, that they identify best practices and draw out 
lessons learned, both positive and negative, as a basis for articulating constructive 
guidelines for practice. The structure of the volume reflects key junctures at which 
questions about evidential reasoning arise in archaeological practice, as well as 
highlighting cross-cutting issues with which practitioners grapple in a wide range of 
fields, wherever they confront the challenge of “building scientific knowledge in the 
absence of infallible foundations,” as Hasok Chang puts in a philosophical history of 
chemistry (2004: 234). We outline first the rationale for the overall structure of the 
volume, and then trace cross-cutting themes that knit it together.  
 
WHAT FOLLOWS: OVERALL STRUCTURE 
We begin with a set of essays on “Fieldwork and Recording Conventions” (Part 1). In 
the first of these, Richard Bradley makes explicit the insight that frames this section 
and much that follows: established norms of ‘good’ excavation and survey practice, 
and conventions of rigorous recording and documentation, were designed to answer 
specific questions which, in turn, presuppose a rich array of assumptions about the 
nature of the subject domain, about what is puzzling or interesting and, crucially, 
what can feasibly be asked about it. They are purpose-built creatures of context that 
have become standardized and persist in training and practice long after the original 
questions are forgotten. Critical histories of archaeological practice recover these 
starting points and reveal how deeply they configure subsequent research: Bradley 
traces the legacy of Pitt Rivers’ now canonical nineteenth century excavations at 
Cranborne Chase; Anna Boozer scrutinizes the shaky foundations of a typology of 
domestic architecture, lost to collective consciousness, that underpins contemporary 
descriptions and comparisons of house forms in Roman Egyptian archaeology; 
Manning reflects on the legacy of a chronology flawed by “a poorly based best 
guess” in Late Bronze Age Agean archaeology (p. 23); and Martin Bell warns against 
the risks of “xeroxing” in which new research simply reproduces established results. 
The central question here is, to what extent do original purposes constrain the 
potential for addressing new questions and putting old evidence to work? Does the 
process of selection and of interpretation “at the trowel’s edge” (Hodder 1997) entail 
that archaeologists will recognize, collect, record, and categorize material in ways 
that answer to their expectations, as the most intransigent epistemic pessimists have 
suspected? In fact, while the cases considered in this section illustrate how deeply 
entrenched the conventions of past practice can be, the stubborn intransigence of 
material evidence is also clearly on view, as remarked upon by Shanks and Tilley 
(1989: 44), and they draw attention to a range of ways in which practitioners can, and 
do, effectively come to terms with these conventions. Bell details empirical 
experimental strategies for recognizing and counteracting “the influence of pre-
understandings” (p. 13); Shahina Farid assesses the successes and challenges of 
the reflexive, interactive pluralism instituted by Hodder at Çatalhöyük; Bradley and 
Boozer both illustrate the value of critical histories designed to interrogate the 
limitations of past practice, the better to build on it; and, turning to the impact of 
computing technologies on field recording, Mike Rains reflects on the variable impact 
of new computer technologies on field recording and data management practices, a 
current and ongoing process that throws into relief the need to tune new technologies 
to the evolving goals of inquiry as well as to existing working practices. 
 
The essays that comprise the next section, “Cross-field Trade” (Part 2), address the 
complex web of interdisciplinary engagements by which archaeologists meet the 
challenges outlined by Bloch. Archaeology is resolutely a ‘trading zone’; throughout 
its history its horizons as a discipline have been expanded dramatically and 
continuously by importing expertise and technologies developed elsewhere for 
application to archaeological problems of data recovery and analysis. At the same 
time, this import trade has been bedeviled by miscommunication and unrealistic 
expectations about what these external resources can deliver. The result is a 
recurrent boom and bust lifecycle of enthusiastic early adoption followed by 
frustration and either premature abandonment or a long difficult process of “settling 
in”: retooling external resources for archaeological purposes. The contributors to this 
section offer jointly historical and pragmatic assessments of how this process has 
unfolded in a number of key areas of engagement. Three consider the ongoing trade 
with high profile physical sciences: Sturt Manning traces the fortunes of radiocarbon 
dating through three revolutions; David Killick juxtaposes with this the challenges of 
realizing comparable precision and accuracy in other physical dating methods, and 
refining stable isotope analysis as a tool for dietary reconstruction; and Mark Pollard 
and Peter Bray reassess archaeometry at a point where technical refinement has 
destabilized the original questions about provenance that set the field in motion in the 
nineteenth century. Marcos Llobera echoes many elements of their retrospective 
assessments of long-standing cross-field engagements, now with respect to newly 
emerging digital simulation techniques: it is crucial, he argues, to cultivate a 
sophisticated understanding of what these tools can (and cannot) do, to keep 
archaeological questions clearly in focus, and to purpose-build applications that 
address these questions rather than allowing tools designed for other purposes to 
dictate the archaeological agenda. In a telling counterpoint to these examples of the 
impact of new technoscience resources, Sara Perry considers the long history of 
visualization drawing attention to the pivotal but often discounted role played by 
professional illustrators in archaeology; their seemingly prosaic practice requires a 
high order of skill that embodies a misrecognized genre of “epistemic productivity” (p. 
4). Taken together these essays bring into sharp focus a number of factors that 
determine the viability of cross-field or external expertise: institutional and funding 
structures, as well as internal hierarchies of expertise and labor, that constrain or 
enable effective transfers and collaborations; training that puts archaeologists in a 
position to adjudicate external expertise and successfully tune it to archaeological 
purposes; and a keen reflective appreciation of how the research agenda of the 
discipline has been both served and circumscribed by cross-field trade. 
 It by now a truism that archaeologists almost never depend on a single line of 
evidential reasoning; as the histories outlined in Part 2 illustrate, they make use of a 
wide range of distinct lines of evidence to assess and to calibrate even the most 
robustly grounded scientific evidential claims. Crucially, as the advocates of 
“unobtrusive measures” in sociology appreciate, the value of mobilizing multiple lines 
of evidence lies in their capacity to be mutually constraining as well as mutually 
reinforcing; triangulation raises the epistemic credibility of the claims they support 
insofar as the independence between distinct lines of evidence counteracts the risk 
of error in any one of them. The contributors to Part 3, “Multiple Working 
Hypotheses,” illustrate various strategies by which archaeologists make an epistemic 
virtue out of what often seems a liability, bringing disparate fragmentary lines of 
evidence into play in the construction and adjudication of interpretive claims of 
various kinds and scales. Amy Bogaard takes up themes articulated by Bradley and 
Bell, showing how an open-ended, iterative process of experimental testing that 
operates on a number of fronts at once – archaeological, ethnobotanical, ecological – 
makes possible a fine-grained comparison of alternative models of early Neolithic 
farming practice. In a complement to Manning’s essay, Alex Bayliss and Alasdair 
Whittle illustrate how a Bayesian modeling approach enables them to systematically 
integrate multiple lines of evidence and rigorously assess margins of error in physical 
dating – the third radiocarbon revolution – in some cases providing temporal 
resolution that brings human-scale action and events into sharp focus. In two essays 
on archaeology and the law, an archaeologist Thomas, and legal scholars Anderson 
and Twining make a case for applying to archaeological problems a system for 
schematically representing and assessing “mixed masses of evidence” that was 
developed in the context of early twentieth century legal theory by John Henry 
Wigmore. Finally, expanding the frame of interpretation, Nicholas and Markey 
consider a diversity of ways in which lines of evidence originating in indigenous oral 
traditions can be brought into productive engagement with archaeological research. It 
is the friction between diverse types of expertise and epistemic standpoints as well 
as between independent lines of evidence that that is productive in these cases.  
 
In the final section, “Broader Perspectives: Material Culture as Object and Evidence 
(Part 4), we close with three essays that take up directly the questions that animate 
the volume as a whole: about the presuppositions that configure archaeological 
practice, and what this practice has to offer the range of other fields in which there is 
growing interest in making use of material evidence. Gavin Lucas scrutinizes the 
ontological assumptions that underpin opposing, dominant conceptions of the 
archaeological record; he asks what this “record” is evidence of, and urges us to “re-
imagine” material traces as surviving elements of enduring assemblages that 
integrate material with practice, and social worlds with agency of diverse kinds. 
Extending this reflection on agency Andrew Jones articulates a parallel shift in the 
framework assumptions that set the terms of archaeological engagement, one that 
closely tracks the arguments now dominant in material culture studies for taking 
material things seriously in their own terms. Rather than assume that archaeological 
materials are ‘mute’ and ‘inert’ until brought to life by our intervention – animated or 
induced to “talk”, to use Daston’s metaphor – Jones explores the potential of an 
‘intra-active’ approach, inspired by Karen Barad’s agential realism (2007), in the 
context of a study of late prehistoric rock art; his practice is predicated on a 
recognition of and engagement with the distinctive “agentive potentiality of objects, 
things or materials” (p. 14). In the final essay of the volume, Simon Werrett reverses 
the direction of inquiry and asks what historians of science might learn from 
archaeological practice. His account of how material evidence has figured in 
historical inquiry sharpens the ambivalence Daston notes, and his response to this 
ambivalence sets against “the fragility of material evidence” (p. 17) an appreciation of 
how archaeological analyses of, experimentation on, and modelling of material 
objects can enlarge the “disciplinary repertoire” of fields like the history of science in 
which there is, increasingly, an acute sense of their relevance, as subjects, 
protagonists and crucial resources for inquiry. 
 
CROSS-CUTTNG THEMES: GETTING THINGS TO TALK IN ARCHAEOLOGY  
The sectional divisions we have outlined are, in their nature, somewhat arbitrary; 
there are all kinds of overlaps in the types of cases considered, the focal issues 
addressed, and the lessons drawn. Reading across the grain all the contributors 
grapple, in one way or another, with what Boozer identifies as a paradox at the heart 
of archaeological practice (p. 2), and in this they take up the threads of the internal 
debate about the limitations of material evidence. She describes material evidence 
as tangible in terms that resonate with Daston’s appraisal of material evidence; it can 
surprise, challenge settled assumptions in ways that reinforce the sense, reported by 
Daston, that it stands as an impartial witness to what happened in its past, but at the 
same time it is radically ambiguous, its significance as evidence a function of 
sedimented layers of interpretiion that can easily reproduce and amplify error. There 
is no escape from what Bell describes as “pre-understandings” (after Hodder 1999) 
and these configure not just the interpretive or explanatory claims that are the focus 
of inquiry, but what will count as evidence in building or adjudicating them. There is 
always the possibility that, as Thomas puts it, the assumptions that guide inquiry will 
“blind you to evidence that might lead in a different direction” (p. 5), and they can do 
this in insidious ways. They may take the form of “value judgments masquerading as 
factual propositions” operating well below the threshold of conscious awareness 
(Anderson and Twining p. 8); they are embedded in conventions of representation, 
as Perry, Llobera, and Rains illustrate in quite different ways (recording forms, 
database structure, conventions of visualization); they are internalized through long 
training and embodied in skilled empirical practice, in archaeology (Bell) as in the 
sciences generally (Werrett); and as Farid shows, taking up Hodder’s “trowels’ edge” 
argument, they are often built into the fabric archaeological practice in the form of 
conventional divisions of labor and work discipline.  
 
The upshot, as Bradley encapsulates this line of thinking, is that the kind of 
“complete objectivity” – in the sense of freedom from interpretive presuppositions – 
that he finds associated with the technical virtuosity of General Pitt Rivers and 
endorsed by Philip Barker (Bradley p. 4) is, in principle, unrealizable. It stands in 
stark contrast to the messy realities of the bootstrapping and scaffolding practices by 
which archaeologists necessarily rely on shaky background assumptions to get 
inquiry off the ground, and then wrestle with the constraints that these tentative 
foundations impose on subsequent research; reliance on pre-understandings is an 
inescapable “condition of possibility” for archaeology (Jones p. 3). But rather than 
take these pre-understandings to be all of a kind and equally insecure, as Smith had 
done and as suggested (briefly) by some of the more intemperate post-processual 
critiques, a great many different kinds of presupposition figure in examples that follow 
and it’s clear that they vary widely in the degree to which they are credible, in 
themselves and in archaeological application. As Anderson and Twining describe the 
background assumptions that underpin evidence-based inferences in legal 
arguments, they can include everything from “well grounded science [and] evolving 
science [to] dubious, contested or junk science”; “practical expertise” and “everyday 
experience”; robust generalizations and one-off anecdotes; common sense, hearsay, 
“speculation … faith … prejudice” (p. 8). There are archaeological counterparts to all 
of these identified in the case studies presented here: the robust background 
knowledge drawn from the physical sciences discussed by Pollard and Bray, 
Manning, Bayliss and Whittle, and Killick that, nonetheless, requires a great deal of 
scaffolding to be useful in archaeological contexts; the emerging information 
technologies appraised by Rains and by Llobera; the embodied expertise of 
professional excavators and illustrators discussed by Farid and by Perry; the rich but 
often discounted oral traditions of indigenous descendant communities highlighted by 
Nicholas and Markey and the contrasting culture-wide conventions of Western 
thought, like the “distinction between nature and culture” discussed by Bradley and 
by Werrett; and the empirical, archaeology-specific pre-understandings drawn from 
type sites and regional sequences that are the anchors for regional typologies and 
chronologies of the kinds discussed by Boozer, Bell, and Manning.  
 
As the details of the case studies make clear, however, archaeologists do routinely 
call out presuppositions of these various kinds when they have become ingrained in 
practice and hold them accountable, conceptually and empirically. In fact, despite 
bringing the uncertainties of evidential reasoning into sharp focus, there are a 
number of striking narratives of success outlined here: chronologies calibrated, 
typologies reconfigured, focal questions reframed, specification of the range of 
application of “middle range theory,” effective tuning of new technologies to 
archaeological problems, and nuanced adjudication of the claims for and against 
seemingly undecidable alternative working hypotheses. It is also clear that, to do this 
– to build, and continuously rebuild, credible background knowledge in the range of 
areas required to sustain archaeological reasoning from material evidence – requires 
a repertoire of critical and constructive methods that are as diverse as the 
presuppositions on which archaeologists rely. Here is a short list of strategies by 
which this is accomplished that stand out for us as editors in the accounts that follow. 
 
First, and most obviously, there are all the strategies by which archaeologists 
generate new data: as Bell puts this point, it ought not be so difficult to “escape the 
tyranny of background knowledge and pre-understandings….the discipline is, after 
all, refreshed by a constant stream of new discoveries” (p. 18). Of course, while 
some empirical discoveries arise unbidden and unanticipated, even they are 
consequential only given a prepared mind, and just as often striking new empirical 
discoveries depend on deliberate innovation – of questions, of search space, of 
technical tools that bring new empirical data on stream. The long process of 
reconciling discordant chronologies detailed by Manning, and the dramatic reframing 
of settled assumptions about cultural sequence and associations that results, as 
illustrated by Bayliss and Whittle as well as Manning, reinforces the point that 
transformative empirical discoveries depend heavily on conceptual scaffolding. So 
too the process of coming to terms with the compositional complexity of metal 
objects outlined by Pollard and Bray where the weight of hard-won evidence 
unsettles the assumptions that inform a “narrowly-defined scientific approach”; they 
describe a growing recognition that repeated melting, mixing and repurposing is not 
the exception but the norm and that the chemical components of these objects are 
themselves dynamic which, in turn, prompts a fundamental rethinking of what it is 
that archaeometallurgists study: “not merely a set of material processes but also the 
human decisions and structures that surround them” (p. 17). The data force the point, 
but they come into view and are salient only given the evolving scaffolding of jointly 
physical and social scientific background knowledge that Pollard and Bray describe.  
 
This means that the action, where evidential reasoning is concerned, is largely off-
stage: it is not so much a matter of discovering new data, as important as this can 
be, but of painstakingly building and continuously reworking the necessary 
background knowledge in an ongoing iterative process, much like what Chang 
describes for chemistry where, he insists, there are no fixed, self-warranting 
foundations (2004: 228-231). The most direct ways of doing this involve experimental 
and “practice-based” research (Bell p. 19) designed to test assumptions about 
practices and processes that produce, or that could have produced specific types of 
archaeological trace. Long-term studies of the erosion of earthworks (Bell), “practical 
experimentation” with quartz assemblages (Jones, p. 10), the chemical analysis of 
metal decay and transformation just described (Pollard and Bray), sharply focused 
testing of ethnographic analogies (Killick), and experimentation with crop yield and 
weed profiles under different farming scenarios (Bogaard) are all examples 
presented here of approaches that are now a staple of archaeological practice. 
Crucially, as Bell argues, this is not typically a process of establishing uniformitarian 
principles that can secure deductive certainty; it is, rather, a matter of specifying with 
as much precision as possible the conditions under which linking principles are likely 
to hold in specific contexts of application. The aim, Manning argues with reference to 
the third radiocarbon revolution, is to replace the “web of a priori assumptions” that 
underpins conventional chronologies, not with the certainty of an imagined silver 
bullet, but with systematic modelling of error (p. 23), a practice that Bayliss and 
Whittle illustrate in a series of cases ranging from highly local human-scale 
occupations to large scale landscapes and millennial timescapes. In addition, several 
contributors make the case for recognizing what might be described as indirect 
evidence generated by experimenting with models themselves: for example, the 
recognition of gestural knowledge as constitutive of experimental practice that arises 
from the reenactments by historians of science that Werrett describes (p. 7); the 
sensitivity analyses Bayliss and Whittle use to assess alternative chronological 
models (p. 20); the distinctive interpretive insights that arise from visualizations 
described by Perry (p. 16) and by Farid (p. 16); and the methods of simulation that, 
Llobera argues, make it possible to explore “basic properties of the study area,” 
extending and contextualizing field observation (p. 18).  
 
When material evidence is put to work building, assessing, testing and refining the 
models and hypotheses that are the focus of inquiry, as indicated earlier it is almost 
invariably in the context of a complex web of evidential reasoning. The contributors 
identify several different ways in which and purposes for which multiple lines of 
evidence are mobilized. For example: Bogaard makes the case for developing 
proxies for the farming practices she studies that are based on completely different 
datasets (p. 12); the impact of bringing new archaeological comparanda to bear 
figures in Bradley’s and Lucas’ discussions of the circumstances that made it 
possible to recognize timber structures in the archaeological record, and is the 
motivation for Boozer’s insistence on the need to reassess architectural typologies in 
Roman Egyptian archaeology; Killick emphasizes the capacity for purpose-built lines 
of material science-based evidence to provide an independent test of interpretive 
assumptions that derive from sources that have dominated interpretation, like 
ethnography or common sense (e.g., about dependence on maize or the labor 
requirements of earthwork construction); and Bayliss and Whittle advocate a 
“pragmatic” Bayesian approach precisely because it is “a formal and explicit 
methodology for weaving together different strands of evidence” (p. 8). As different as 
these cases are, they share a common rationale for expanding the range of 
evidence: to exploit the potential for independent lines of evidence to constrain one 
another, counteracting the risks of “xeroxing” (Bell), and identifying error in individual 
lines of evidence that might not otherwise be recognized, as well as for enriching 
interpretation, bringing previously inscrutable aspects of the past into view.  
 
A recurrent theme emphasized by a number of contributors is the need for rigorous 
transparency about the constituents of these webs of inference and the “analytical 
scaffolding” (Boozer p. 18) that underpins them. This is a particular virtue of Bayesian 
modeling – “it force[s] archaeologists to be explicit about the strands of their 
reasoning” (Bayliss and Whittle, p. 8) – and it is the reason why Thomas, and 
Anderson and Twining, advocate the application to archaeological problems of a 
modified Wigmore method for schematizing the empirical and inferential components 
of evidential reasoning. It is only possible to build on and refine tentative foundations 
in an ongoing, iterative process if the bases for earlier inferences are kept clearly in 
view. Citing Gero (2007), Boozer urges a commitment to “honor ambiguity” rather 
than smoothing, cleaning or otherwise suppressing the messiness and uncertainty of 
the descriptive and interpretive claims that become the basis for subsequent 
reasoning with archaeological data. By extension, it is crucial to resist the kind of 
canalization of thinking that comes from investment in a seemingly a “best” 
hypothesis. In this spirit, Bayliss and Whittle warn against the potential of provisional 
models to “fossilise” and “become received wisdom” (p. 18), Nicholas and Markey 
note the risks of “intellectual complacency” that come with considering only the range 
of evidence and hypotheses that have become familiar staples of disciplinary inquiry, 
and Killick warns against a “’good enough’ attitude towards scientific evidence” (p. 
18). They join Bogaard, among others, in stressing the importance of keeping 
multiple working hypotheses in play even while working to reduce the range of viable 
options by elimination testing. Model and hypothesis evaluation is typically 
comparative; the outcome can only be a (tentative) judgment about the relative 
strengths of the alternatives considered, which carries with it the risk that an 
“inference to the best explanation” will endorse the best of a set of limited set of 
possibilities. It is crucial, Bogaard argues, to guard against “propensity to infer that 
the ‘best’ explanation at any given moment is true”; it may only be “best” given a 
failure to conceive of relevant other possibilities (16).  
 
One way to realize transparency about underpinnings and alternatives is to put 
critical historiography to work as a way of taking distance from entrenched 
conventions and mobilizing the wisdom of hindsight. Bradley urges “a kind of 
historiography” (p. 4) in the context of reengaging legacy data that involves, not just 
returning to the data and records generated by past excavations, but situating them 
in a broader motivational, social and political context. This holds the potential, he 
argues, for realizing a degree of “repeatability”: rerunning the process of 
interpretation in light of new archaeological comparanda and with an awareness of 
how broad cultural sensibilities have shifted. It puts him in a position to recognize the 
cultural significance of geological features that had been dismissed as natural. In this 
spirit a number of other contributors develop genealogies of key concepts or modes 
of practice that configure contemporary archaeology: Lucas scrutinizes the legacy, in 
our understanding of “the archaeological record,” of metaphors of survival (relic) and 
fragmentation (ruin) rooted in nineteenth century traditions of Romanticism and 
antiquarianism; Perry considers the institutional and disciplinary history of 
archaeological illustration; those who discuss archaeological science trace the 
tangled histories of “cross-field trade.”  
 
Another way to promote transparency is to cultivate pluralism of a number of different 
kinds. The commitment to make use of the full “toolkit of available approaches” (Bell, 
p. 1) is not just a matter of making full use of available resources; extending this 
maxim, Farid highlights how the friction between specialisms, various forms of 
expertise, and standpoints can be enormously productive in mobilizing critical and 
constructive insights no one brought to the table in the first instance. She and Perry 
argue for recognizing diverse forms of “epistemic productivity” (Perry p. 10), including 
forms of expertise that are marginalized within archaeology, while Nicholas and 
Markey illustrate the value of taking seriously external resources that have selectively 
been read out of consideration: “even contradictory lines of evidence have value,” 
throwing into relief what has come to be “common sense” for archaeologists and 
opening up interpretive and explanatory options. A key advantage of Wigmore 
schemas as described by Anderson and Twining is that they require clarification of 
the standpoint from which an evidential argument has been developed, so that it can 
be evaluated from multiple perspectives. A pluralism of standpoints is a key resource 
for generating a repertoire of multiple working hypotheses that have the potential to 
counter the worries Bogaard raises about unconceived alternatives. This is reflexivity 
made concrete. It is not primarily a matter of introspection; we are often the last to be 
aware of the taken-for-granteds that inform our own practice. Rather, it is a form of 
(collective) self-appraisal that depends on putting second-order empirical methods of 
analysis to work – historical and genealogical, comparative and contextualizing – to 
bring into focus pre-understandings embodied in specific questions and contexts of 
inquiry now forgotten or internalized as encompassing disciplinary or cultural 
assumptions.  
 
The reflexive appraisals of evidential reasoning presented here have a number of 
implications for orienting ideals and goals, and for the pragmatics of practice. They 
suggest, for example, the need to rethink the epistemic ideals of that inform 
programmatic debate and practice. Rather than take “objectivity” to be self-evidently 
a matter of transcending context or insulating against the influence of pre-
understandings, the argument emerging here suggests the need to unpack the 
specific epistemic virtues gathered together (uneasily) under the aegis of this term, 
and consider in concrete terms how they are best realized in particular contexts of 
practice, for particular purposes. A resolutely pragmatic, proceduralist conception of 
objectivity is taking shape in these contributions that calls for a more nuanced and 
self-consciously situated account of epistemic success than the deductivism of a 
vernacular positivism that has set the terms of the sharply polarized debate between 
processual and post-processual archaeologists.  
 
This reassessment extends as well to the practicalities of archaeological inquiry: how 
archaeologists are trained and how research is organized and funded. Killick, and 
Pollard and Bray particularly emphasize the need for training designed to cultivate 
the kind of scientific literacy necessary for archaeologists to make effective, well-
informed use of scientific analyses of archaeological material. The perils of treating 
scientific analysis of archaeological material as a “self-service buffet” (Pollard and 
Bray, p. 2), appropriating the results of poorly understood specialist techniques 
without a clear sense of archaeological purpose, is reiterated with reference to digital 
technologies by Llobera and by Rains. The central message here is that the silos of 
specialism that set disciplinary archaeology apart from the myriad other fields on 
which it depends constitute a structural constraint that archaeologists must 
continuously struggle to overcome. Perry and Farid make a similar point with respect 
to hierarchies of expertise within archaeology. The success of evidential reasoning 
depends on establishing institutional and funding structures, work processes and 
channels of communication that can sustain “productive and trustworthy forms of 
cooperation” (Killick p. 3) between archaeologists and those with whom they trade, 
internally and externally.  
 
This is to reaffirm the point made by Bloch in the 1950s, articulated here with 
attention to practicalities which make it clear that effective engagement with things 
will not be accomplished by tooling up new expertise within discrete fields. The 
successes working with material evidence that have been realized by archaeologists 
depend in large measure on creating archaeology as a dynamic trading zone 
(Galison 2010), building an expansive network of technical, empirical, theoretical 
exchange underpinned by the kind of “diplomatic tradition” Nicholas and Markey 
describe with reference to the Haudenosaunee. It is to be hoped that the passion for 
things now manifest in a growing range of neighbouring fields may be an opening for 
extending this network.  
 
ENDNOTES 
1 While Myers (2001) identifies material culture studies as taking shape since the 
1990s, Miller describes entering a field already formed in the early 1980s (2005: 4). 
The impetus was, in any case, a critique of the presumption that objects are static 
media in which social meaning is reflected, “inert and mute, set in motion and 
animated, indeed knowable, only by persons and their words…divorced from the 
capacity of persons to act and the power of words to communicate” (Appadurai 1986: 
4). 
 2 At an extreme of animating objects and attending to “things themselves,” the 
arguments for embracing distributed, hybrid forms of agency – the “vital materialism” 
of Bennett’s Vibrant Matter (2010; Haraway’s cyborgs and Latour’s hybrids – 
resonate with the case made by recent advocates of object ethnography for refusing 
Cartesian dichotomies altogether; mind and matter, meaning and material are 
inseparable, the locus of proliferating ontologies (Henare et al. 2007: 3). 
 
3 In addition to E. P. Thompson, this group included Christopher Hill, Rodney Hilton, 
and Eric Hobsbawm, among others. 
 
4 This collaboration was not a happy or successful experience. Although the 
excavations at Upton made a contribution to archaeological research on deserted 
medieval villages, Hilton found the fieldwork “rather tedious” (Rahtz 2001: 91). There 
was no integration of historical texts and archaeological evidence in the publication 
(Hilton and Rahtz 1966). 
 
5 Jones extends this objection in his contribution to this volume, finding in Gell an 
example of the limiting conception of ‘material agency’ that he means to push 
beyond. Although Gell advocates closer attention to material objects, on Jones’ 
account he nonetheless treats them as “a derived form of agency,” reproducing 
Cartesian dichotomies that reduce their “agentive potentialities”; even though art 
objects exist in a nexus of relations, in the end they “stand in for” human relations 
and intentions (INTERNAL REF). 
 
6 Sibum goes on to observe that there continues to be a systematic bias in favor of 
text-based scholarship; the study of literary sources is recognized as historical 
“scholarship” while close study of material objects is demeaned as a form of 
connoisseurship (Auschlander et al. 2009: 1384). 
 
7 We were alerted to this passage of Bloch’s The Historian’s Craft by Carole Crumley 
who quotes it, in her own translation, in the Forward to Advances in Historical 
Ecology (1998: ix). 
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